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1 Introduction
The outbreak of COVID-19 came as a shock to market participants.1 Of the five risks listed
as being most likely to materialize in the World Economic Forum (2020)’s Global Risk
Report, published on January 15, 2020, all five concern environmental issues. The topic
‘‘infectious diseases’’ was ranked number 10 in terms of impact, but quite unlikely. Only a
few weeks later, attention shifted dramatically. On March 11, the World Health Organization
characterized COVID-19 as a pandemic.2
This paper studies the cross-section of stock price reactions to COVID-19. This analysis
serves three purposes. First, COVID-19 provides an unfortunate, but valuable opportunity to
gain insights into drivers of firm value using a truly exogenous shock. Studies of the firm value
impacts of corporate financial decisions that exploit events, such as the global financial crisis,
political events, or regulatory changes, may under- or overestimate these impacts in unknown
ways. This is because such events (a) are at least partially endogenous to corporate decisions
(e.g., the financial crisis), (b) often have a widely discussed, nontrivial probability of occurring
(e.g., political events), and/or (c) are relatively slow to unfold (e.g., regulatory changes). The
COVID-19 crisis---a health emergency serving as a natural experiment---provides a cleaner
setting for such a study. In this paper, we exploit this setting to quantify the firm-level
impact of a disruption in global trade, to identify the benefits of corporate financial strength,
and to understand how real shocks can propagate through financial channels.
Second, the events of the first quarter of 2020 offer glimpses of how markets process
1‘‘COVID-19’’ refers to what was previously known as the ‘‘coronavirus disease 2019.’’ The virus that
causes it has been named ‘‘SARS-CoV-2,’’ though in line with common usage we sometimes refer simply to
‘‘coronavirus’’ in this paper.
2A present-day situation overview of the situation, including the numbers of confirmed cases and deaths
in all countries, can be found here: https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus.
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information as a rare disaster unfolds. The rare disaster literature shows how some puzzles in
finance (e.g., excess volatility and high equity premiums) can be rationalized as an attempt
by investors to price in the tail risk of future disaster events (e.g., Gabaix, 2012; Gourio,
2012; Wachter, 2013). This literature highlights how the exposure of firms to tail risk events
is difficult to assess empirically, because, fortunately, such events rarely materialize. This
study of how financial markets react to the actual realization of a pandemic provides insights
into which firm characteristics are associated with more or less fragility to tail risk events,
and hence can also help to better understand how the possibility of such events differentially
affects firm value during ‘‘normal’’ times.
Third, stock price reactions offer a preview of the future economic impact of COVID-19.
The spread of the disease, its severity and mortality rate, the policy responses, and individual
behavior are unknown, complicating attempts to quantify the expected economic impact of
the disease. Asset price changes capture current expectations; the researcher does not need
to trace all the future changes to cash flows and discount rates separately (Schwert, 1981).
It is particularly interesting to study the timing of stock price reactions and analyst inquiries
on corporate conference calls in the United States, which initially was not directly affected
by COVID-19.
We organize our primary analysis along three periods, which we label Incubation (Thurs-
day, January 2 through Friday, January 17), Outbreak (Monday, January 20 through Friday,
February 21), and Fever (Monday, February 24 through Friday, March 20). We describe
the timeline of events characterizing each of these periods in Section 2. Corporate managers
and analysts clearly started paying attention to (or at least started openly talking about) the
coronavirus in the Outbreak period. The first U.S. conference call in which the coronavirus
2
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was discussed (the earnings call of United Airlines) occurred on January 22. By the second
week of March, almost all conference calls discussed the topic.
We start by providing evidence of heterogeneous impacts of COVID-19 on stock returns
across industries. For instance, as an ominous sign that the crisis is potentially wide-reaching,
in the Fever period consumer services were the biggest losers, and food and staples retailers
were among the strongest winners.
Our main analysis of stock price reactions focuses on differences within industries. We
study the role of firm’s exposure to international trade and of corporate debt and cash
holdings. The former is of interest to study the initial real effects of COVID-19 on U.S.
firms through the disruption in global trade. The latter is of interest to learn when and to
what extent the real shock of COVID-19 was perceived by investors to also bring risks of
disruption in access to capital.
First, more export or supply chain exposure to China---as measured by firm disclosures
analyzed by Hoberg and Moon (2017, 2019)---resulted in substantially lower returns in the
Incubation and Outbreak periods.3 Investors penalized not only firms trading with China
but also those that are internationally oriented more generally. These results identify the
disruption of global trade as an early effect of COVID-19 on the real economy.
Importantly, toward the end of February, while the health situation in Europe and the
United States began worsening, the situation in China actually started improving. One
would expect, therefore, stocks exposed to China to do relatively better in anticipation of the
reopening of the Chinese economy. This is indeed what we find.
3Firms exporting to China would arguably have been favored with the ‘‘Phase 1’’ agreement regarding
trade between the United States and China, which was signed on January 15 and which entered into force on
February 14. Thus, they may have suffered more from the COVID-19 outbreak if it had not been for the
arguably good news contained in the agreement.
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Second, we study the role of cash and leverage for firm value as the COVID-19 crisis
unfolded. It is far from clear what one would expect here. After all, lack of liquidity (low
cash) and refinancing risks (high leverage) per se are not frictions of importance in well-
functioning capital markets. We find, however, that within the same industry and controlling
for standard firm characteristics, firms with little cash holdings suffered severely in the Fever
period. Firms with high leverage also did poorly. The effects are economically sizeable: a
one standard deviation in cash holdings explains approximately one-sixth of the standard
deviation of returns in the Fever period, net of the effects of other firm characteristics and
market beta, with another one-sixth explained by a one standard deviation in leverage.
Strikingly, the effects of cash and leverage are more important in those industries that
suffered stronger stock price declines, that is, those harder hit by the effects of the pandemic.
Moreover, leverage is of greater concern to investors in cash-poor firms, and in value firms.
Next, we study when and how managers and analysts discussed COVID-19 during
conference calls. COVID-19 was a topic mostly during calls of internationally oriented firms
and firms with low cash holdings. Interestingly, in the Outbreak period, calls covering the
coronavirus had a more negative linguistic tone (Loughran and McDonald, 2011) for more
internationally oriented firms; in the Fever period, calls covering the coronavirus had a more
negative tone for highly leveraged firms. These findings confirm that the patterns identified
in the cross-section of returns reflect real concerns about the prospects of individual firms.
In sum, the results show that the Incubation and Outbreak periods mostly saw investors
price in the effects of the evolving health crisis on international trade. The Fever period
brought about a switch in market participants’ concerns to broader systemic issues, presumably
4
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also in light of preexisting fragilities in the credit markets.4 Overall, these findings suggest
that investors expected the real (nonfinancial) shock caused by the outbreak of COVID-19
to be amplified by financial channels.
The focus of this paper is on the initial impact of COVID-19. However, ‘‘beyond-study-
period’’ events suggest that some policy interventions helped in reassuring investors that
the further propagation of financial stress would be softened. Specifically, on March 23
the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) announced two new facilities to support credit to large
corporations, and on March 27 the CARES Act, a US$2 trillion relief bill, became law. In a
3-day window following the Fed’s intervention, investor concerns about corporate debt and
liquidity partially reversed. The concerns remained, however, at high levels and show up
again in the cross-section of stock returns when extending the evaluation window to 10 days
after the Fed’s intervention, through April 3, 2020.
This paper contributes, first, by providing novel causal evidence of the importance for
firm value of (a) trade and (b) financial policies. As for (a), some existing studies indicate
that the stock prices of internationally oriented firms are significantly affected by changes in
(expected) trade policies (e.g., Desai and Hines, 2008; Wagner, Zeckhauser, and Ziegler, 2018;
Huang et al., 2019).5 However, a concern with such political or regulatory changes is that
they are often partially anticipated.6 Given its sudden and disruptive nature, the COVID-19
4Concerns about such fragilities have existed for a long time. See, for example, Kaplan (2019).
5Desai and Hines (2008) document stock price losses for U.S. exporting firms in 1997, when the European
Union (EU) asked the WTO to declare U.S. export subsidies illegal. Wagner, Zeckhauser, and Ziegler (2018)
show that after the surprising outcome of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, stock prices adjusted to the
shift in expectations on trade policy. In particular, more internationally oriented firms were penalized. Huang
et al. (2019) show that the U.S.-China trade war in 2018 and 2019 affected the stock prices of firms exposed
to U.S.-China trade.
6See Langer and Lemoine (2020) for a summary of these concerns and two novel methods for recovering
the market’s priced-in probability of events.
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crisis is a particularly strong setting to identify how the dependency of some U.S. firms on
international trade, and specifically on relations with China, affects their value.7
As for (b), our paper capitalizes on the exogeneity of the COVID-19 shock to provide novel
causal evidence of the role of leverage and cash for firm value during economic recessions.
Prior work argues that leverage can significantly affect firms’ operating performance during
market downturns (e.g., Opler and Titman, 1994).8 The role of cash as a buffer of liquidity
has also received substantial attention (e.g., Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Bates,
Kahle, and Stulz, 2009; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Lins, Servaes, and Tufano, 2010). Some
papers study these dimensions in the context of the Great Recession (see, e.g., Duchin, Ozbas,
and Sensoy, 2010; Campello et al., 2011, 2012; Giroud and Mueller, 2017; Gilchrist et al.,
2017; Joseph et al., 2020).9 Two challenges need to be borne in mind when interpreting
these studies. First, the slowing of investment opportunities and worsening of economic
sentiment in anticipation of ‘‘usual’’ crises, including the Great Recession, is likely to affect
firms’ financial policies.10 Second, while the finding that cash and leverage mattered so much
in the Global Financial Crisis is important, it follows naturally from the origin of that crisis
in the financial sector, which caused a shock to firms’ access to credit.
7See Baldwin and Tomiura (2020) for a macroeconomic discussion of China’s role as the ‘‘workshop of
the world.’’ More broadly, the results add to the large literature that documents the importance of trade and
global value chains in today’s economy; see Antràs (2016) and Antràs (2020) for overviews.
8More generally, financial leverage is an important channel through which macroeconomic shocks propagate
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
9Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) find that during the 2007--2008 financial crisis, corporate investment
declined more for firms with a higher dependency on external finance and that firms with high cash holdings
performed better at the onset of the crisis. Campello et al. (2011) and Campello et al. (2012) study how cash
holdings and credit lines affected real activities during the crisis. Gilchrist et al. (2017) provide evidence
that firms with limited internal liquidity and high operating leverage were forced to increase prices in 2008.
Giroud and Mueller (2017) document that high-leverage firms experienced larger employment losses during
the great recession. Joseph et al. (2020) show that corporate cash holdings before the crisis also increased
firms’ competitive advantage during the recovery phase.
10Researchers are keenly aware of these endogeneity concerns. For instance, Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy
(2010) measure firms’ financial positions as much as 4 years prior to the crisis, whereas Joseph et al. (2020)
exploit, among other things, cross-sectoral differences in predicted tightening of financial constraints.
6
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3550274
By contrast, COVID-19 primarily is a shock to the real economy, initially unrelated to
the availability of external finance. Our results on the stock price effects of leverage and
cash indicate that the market anticipated a potential amplification of the real shock through
financial channels. The exogenous nature of COVID-19 provides a powerful setting to obtain
new insights into the benefits of financial strength during economic downturns.
As a second contribution, the paper provides the first analysis of cross-sectional stock
price responses to the emergence of COVID-19, shedding light on how markets react to the
realization of a tail risk event. Since the initial version of this paper, several studies have been
released that consider other aspects of the financial market responses. Gormsen and Koijen
(2020), Landier and Thesmar (2020), and Alfaro et al. (2020) study the interplay of changes
in growth expectations and uncertainty in driving stock returns.11 Fahlenbrach, Rageth, and
Stulz (2020), Acharya and Steffen (2020), and Halling, Yu, and Zechner (2020) study the
effects of firms’ financial policies and financial decisions, adding further insights to those
established in this paper.12 Albuquerque et al. (2020) and Pagano, Wagner, and Zechner
(2020) focus on other important dimensions of stock price resilience to the pandemic.13 Ding
11Gormsen and Koijen (2020) look at the aggregate equity market and exploit the information contained
in dividend futures. They conclude that the stock market fell well beyond changes in growth expectations due
to changes in discount rates (uncertainty), consistent with the evidence in Shiller (1981) and Campbell and
Shiller (1988). Landier and Thesmar (2020) draw similar conclusions from analysts’ forecast revisions. Alfaro
et al. (2020) show that stock returns respond to daily unanticipated changes in COVID-19 cases, implying
declining stock market volatility as the trajectory of the pandemic becomes less uncertain. They also show
that stock price reactions to COVID-19 forecast job losses at the regional level.
12Fahlenbrach, Rageth, and Stulz (2020) confirm our results on cash and debt. They also find that the ex
ante ability of firms to access financial markets (based on popular measures of financial constraints) does
not explain returns, whereas their actual need to access them in order not to run out of cash does. In their
sample, firms that paid out more through dividends or repurchases before the crisis did not perform worse.
Acharya and Steffen (2020) document the drawdowns of credit lines and bond issuance activities during
the COVID-19 crisis. Halling, Yu, and Zechner (2020) study bond and equity issuance activities an d the
changes in the determinants of corporate bond spreads.
13Albuquerque et al. (2020) document that firms with high environmental and social ratings fared better
during the market turmoil. Pagano, Wagner, and Zechner (2020) find that firms in industries less affected by
social distancing outperformed not only in the COVID-19 outbreak but also in the years before, whereas
going forward these firms are expected to yield lower returns.
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et al. (2020), Gerding, Martin, and Nagler (2020), Ru, Yang, and Zou (2020), and Croce,
Farroni, and Wolfskeil (2020) employ international samples.14
Finally, a burgeoning literature is addressing the real economic consequences of the
pandemic. The books edited by Baldwin and Weder di Mauro (2020a,b) provide an overview
of some early contributions.15 This paper informs this literature by showing how stock prices
can serve as an incentivized and continuously updated summary of investors’ expectations
about the ultimate economic impacts of the virus.
2 Dates of Key Events and Investor Attention
We start by describing the key events and the evolution of investor attention to COVID-19
as the crisis unfolded.16 We investigate three periods, which we label Incubation (Thursday
January 2 to Friday, January 17), Outbreak (Monday, January 20 to Friday, February 21),
and Fever (Monday, February 24 through Friday, March 20).
First, on December 31, 2019, cases of pneumonia detected in Wuhan, China, were first
reported to the World Health Organization (WHO), and on January 1, 2020, Chinese health
authorities closed the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market after it was discovered that the
wild animals sold there may be the source of the virus (World Health Organization, 2020a).17
14Ding et al. (2020) confirm the role of previously documented firm characteristics and additionally study
the role of corporate governance; Gerding, Martin, and Nagler (2020) find stronger stock price reactions
in countries with higher debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratios; and Ru, Yang, and Zou (2020) find
faster and stronger stock market responses in countries that suffered more from SARS. Croce, Farroni, and
Wolfskeil (2020) study how major financial markets process news and tweets about COVID-19.
15For instance, Caballero and Simsek (2020) study how asset price spirals and aggregate demand contrac-
tions can amplify the COVID-19 supply shock. Lewis, Mertens, and Stock (2020) offer a (almost) real-time
index of economic activity in the United States.
16For a detailed chronology of COVID-19, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_
2019-20_coronavirus_outbreak.
17The cases originally reported to the WHO occurred between December 12 and December 29, according to
Wuhan Municipal Health. In the meantime, it has transpired that the first known patient started experiencing
8
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The first trading day after these events was January 2, 2020. News continued to trickle
out after this day. For example, Dr. Li Wenliang, an ophthalmologist at Wuhan Central
Hospital warned alumni from his medical school class via WeChat about the emergence of
SARS coronavirus, which later turned out to be the novel coronavirus (Green, 2020).18 Some
events occurred outside mainland China. For example, as early as January 6, Hong Kong
began screening passengers on trains that had stopped at Wuhan, and the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention issued an advice to avoid animals, animal markets, and
contact with unwell people if traveling to Wuhan.
Second, on January 20, Chinese health authorities confirmed human-to-human transmis-
sion of the coronavirus, and the following day the WHO issued the first situation report
on the outbreak (China’s National Health Commission, 2020; World Health Organization,
2020b). Monday, January 20 was Martin Luther King Jr. Day in the United States. The
first trading day in the United States in this phase, therefore, was January 21.
Third, on Sunday February 23, Italy placed almost 50,000 people under strict lockdown
(not far from the country’s main economic center of Milan) in an attempt to control the
outbreak after registering its first deaths from coronavirus on Saturday, February 22 (Italy’s
Council of Ministers, 2020). The first trading day in this phase, therefore, was February 24.
Extraordinary events too numerous to list here followed. The President of the United States
announced a travel ban on EU countries on March 11 and declared the COVID-19 outbreak
a national emergency on March 13. The second-worst day ever of the Dow Jones Industrial
symptoms on December 1 (Huang et al., 2020). He had not been to the Wuhan market.
18The fact that a coronavirus of the present sort might cause an epidemic is not a complete surprise. For
example, a study published in March 2019 by researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Technology concluded
that ‘‘future SARS- or MERS-like Coronavirus outbreaks will originate from bats, and there is an increased
probability that this will occur in China’’ (Fan et al., 2019).
9
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3550274
Index happened on March 16; three of the 15 worst days ever occurred between March 9 and
16. But also one of the top 10 surges in the market ever took place in this time period. On
March 16, the Chicago Board Option Exchange’s Volatility Index, known as the VIX, surged
past the prior all-time peak (reached in the financial crisis more than a decade ago).19
We choose these three periods because they naturally follow from the timeline of events.
We end the Fever period on March 20, because on March 23 the Federal Reserve Board
announced major interventions in the corporate bond market. These interventions are
discussed briefly in Section 5.
It is of course not surprising that COVID-19 received the attention of market participants;
what is of interest is when COVID-19 caught their attention. To illustrate how intensely
attention of market participants changed over time, Figure 1 plots the number of conference
calls by U.S. firms on different dates.20 It shows that corporate managers and analysts appear
to have started paying attention to the novel coronavirus after January 20 only. The first
conference call discussing any of the keywords ‘‘coronavirus,’’ ‘‘covid-19,” ‘‘2019-ncov,’’ or
‘‘sars-cov-2’’ took place on January 22. This was the earnings call of United Airlines. From
that point onward, the fraction of U.S. firms discussing these topics markedly increased over
time, to around 30% at the end of the Outbreak period. When the Fever period began, that
fraction increased to around 50%. By the second week of March, almost all calls featured a
discussion of COVID-19.
19Baker et al. (2020) document the drastic spike in economic uncertainty in this period through an analysis
of stock market volatility, newspaper-based uncertainty measures, and subjective uncertainty in business
expectation surveys.
20To obtain a broad picture of the communication surrounding the topic, we include not only earnings
conference calls but also other calls, such as a roadshow presentations and investor conferences. Thus, some
firms show up multiple times in this sample.
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Figure 1 (Attention to Coronavirus in the United States) about here
The intensity of search on Google is a measure of retail investor interest in a topic (Da,
Engelberg, and Gao, 2015). Therefore, we also consider Google searches for ‘‘coronavirus.’’
Again, the time pattern is of interest to us. Figure 1 shows (on the right y-axis) that search
intensity increased after January 20.21 Search intensity for ‘‘coronavirus’’ then somewhat
subsided after its interim peak at the end of January. But in the Fever period, the search
intensity surged, suggesting that retail investors were highly attentive and presumably active
in the market at that time. (As shown in Figure A1 in the Internet Appendix, similar
patterns are visible when looking at global conference calls and global Google search.)
It is important to note that some other events also occurred in this period. For example,
on the weekend of March 7/8, a price war erupted in the oil market. Moreover, the U.S.
Presidential Election Primaries were ongoing.22 Finally, there were noticeable developments
in the trade war between the United States and China.23
Therefore, contrary to an event study where there is one clear event date, which is followed
by price adjustment, the situation here features a series of a news. At any given point in
21A minor uptick in search activity for ‘‘Wuhan’’ in Chinese search can be detected in early January
already, but this is not visible in U.S. searches.
22The relatively successful showing of Joe Biden on ‘‘Super Tuesday’’ on March 3, where presumably
many investors had worried about a Bernie Sanders win, conceivably explains a positive market move that
day. Some industries, such as health care, may be particularly sensitive to the probability of a Biden win.
23Seen overall, these events are likely to have helped U.S. firms exporting to China, but they do not
significantly improve the situation for U.S. firms importing from China. First, on January 15, China
and the United States signed the so-called ‘‘Phase 1’’ trade deal. Under the agreement, China agreed to
purchase the extraordinary amount of an additional US$200 billion worth of U.S. exports. Most tariffs
remained in effect, and China did not give in to U.S. demands on subsidies or state-owned enterprises.
Second, on January 24, President Trump imposed new tariffs on around US$450 million of steel and
aluminum products. While small in magnitude, the signal was negative. On February 14, the ‘‘Phase 1’’
deal went into effect. The average U.S. tariffs on imports from China remain elevated at 19.3%, more
than six times higher than before the trade war began in 2018. Average Chinese tariffs on U.S. goods are
20.3%, down only slightly from 20.9% when the deal was announced in December 2019. For details, see
https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch.
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time it is impossible to state whether a price move is the incorporation of new information
on that day, or continuation of adjustment (or reversal of adjustment) on prior days. Our
goal is to provide an overall assessment of the stock price development over time.
3 Stock Price Reactions
This section presents results on stock price reactions. Section 3.1 presents the data and
discusses the appropriateness of different returns as the variables of interest. Section 3.2
presents a descriptive overview of industry-level stock returns. Our main results are reported
in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. We capitalize on the wide variation, within industries, in the potential
exposure of firms to the effects of the Coronavirus. We focus on the role of international
trade, debt, and cash holdings.
3.1 Data
3.1.1 Stock returns.
We retrieve daily stock prices for common shares from December 31, 2018 through April 3,
2020, from the Compustat Capital IQ North America Daily database (from Wharton Research
Data Services, WRDS). We adjust prices for dividends through the daily multiplication factor
and the price adjustment factors provided by Compustat. In cases of dual listings, we keep
only the firm’s security with the highest market capitalization. Our main sample consists of
Russell 3000 constituents.24 For our firm-level analysis, in line with the common practice in
24The Russell 3000 index includes the 3,000 largest publicly held companies incorporated in the United
States and represents approximately 98% of the total U.S. public equity market. No firm in our sample has
less than US$10 million of market equity capitalization as of the end of 2019.
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finance research, we exclude financial companies (with GICS sector code equal to 40) because
a key variable of interest in that analysis is leverage, which is hardly comparable between
financial and nonfinancial firms (Fama and French, 1992).25 (Our results hold even when
including financials.)
To estimate each firm’s market beta, we regress one year of daily excess returns (from
January 2, 2019, through December 31, 2019) on a constant and the daily market factor. The
market excess return and the return on the riskless asset (the U.S. 1-month Treasury-bill rate)
are from Kenneth French’s website. To ensure the precision of our estimates, we compute
abnormal returns only for stocks with at least 127 daily observations in the estimation period.
We compute capital asset pricing model (CAPM)-adjusted returns (CAPM alphas) as the
daily excess return on the stock minus the stock’s beta times the market excess return.26
Similarly, we also compute Fama-French-adjusted returns as the daily excess return on
the stock minus its factor exposures times the factor returns, where the factor exposures
are computed on daily market excess return, size, and value factor returns (obtained from
Kenneth French’s website) throughout 2019.
Before embarking on our analysis of the stock price reactions, it is worthwhile reflecting on
which approach is best suited to describe returns in our empirical setting. Conceptually, the
purpose of adjusting returns in accordance with a factor model (CAPM, Fama and French,
1993; Carhart, 1997; Fama and French, 2015, among others) is to eliminate the impact
25Throughout the paper, we adopt the GICS industry classification, mostly because of its broad popularity
among practitioners, which fits well with our empirical goal of studying how investors reacted to COVID-19.
For evidence on the superior performance of the GICS classification in explaining stock return comovements
and other financial similarities between sectors, see, for example, Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler (2003).
26All our inferences remain unchanged if we compute CAPM-adjusted returns by subtracting from the
excess returns, in addition to the stock’s beta times the market excess return, also the stock’s estimated 2019
alpha (which is equivalent to assuming full ‘‘momentum’’ on each stock’s 2019 average performance).
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of factors that are unrelated to the specific effects under investigation. For our empirical
investigation, we consider two aspects.
First, Figure A2 in the Internet Appendix shows that our main firm characteristics of
interest (international trade, cash holdings, and leverage) are positively correlated with the
average loading on the market factor returns in 2019. To the extent that the aggregate
market moves in our sample period are driven by COVID-19 concerns, using CAPM-adjusted
returns may understate the role of firm-specific characteristics on stock returns. A fraction of
their effects, in fact, is lost in the (removed) effect of the market beta. Similar considerations
hold for the adjustment for Fama-French factors.27
Second, more importantly, when using adjusted returns, a key assumption is that the
exposure to the (risk) factors has remained constant through the period under consideration.
However, COVID-19 likely changed the perception of the market risk of many firms. That
is, a beta estimated using 2019 returns is likely to represent only an imprecise proxy of the
market risk exposure during and after the COVID-19 crisis. For example, when we reestimate
the individual market beta of Russell 3000 nonfinancial firms using daily returns in Q1 2020,
we find that it has a correlation of only 0.17 with the market beta estimated using 2019
returns. For comparison, the average quarter-to-quarter correlation of estimated market
betas based on the four quarters of 2019 is 0.51.
In light of these considerations, we adopt the following complementary approaches: First,
we run regressions using raw returns as the dependent variable and controlling for the
stock exposure to the 2019 market factor (beta) directly in the regressions. Throughout,
27See Wagner, Zeckhauser, and Ziegler (2018) for an analogous discussion in the context of the 2016 U.S.
Presidential election.
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we control for year 2019 firm characteristics (firm size, book-to-market, and profitability).
With this approach, we effectively quantify the explanatory power of international trade
and financial policies for stock price moves relative to firms’ prior risk perception. Second,
we conduct the analysis using CAPM-adjusted returns as the dependent variable. Finally,
we run regressions when controlling for the exposure to the Fama-French factors and when
using Fama-French-adjusted returns. All these approaches yield similar inferences overall.
3.1.2 Firm characteristics.
We employ two data sources for U.S. firms’ international trade: (1) data from Hoberg and
Moon (2017, 2019) that relies on firms’ disclosures about their international activities and (2)
data from the Compustat Segments database.
First, Hoberg and Moon (2017, 2019) analyze 10-Ks for annually updated firm disclosures
regarding their international activities. Effectively, their method counts the number of
times each country is mentioned. Importantly, their method allows distinguishing between
input-offshoring (sourcing supplies from another country) and export-offshoring (exporting).28
We define China (1/0) as a binary indicator variable equal to one for firms with disclosed
activities with China, via exporting, importing, or both. This variable captures the extensive
margin. For the intensive margin, we define China output (#) and China input (#) as the
number of times a firm mentions China in their 10-K in relation to importing or exporting
activities.29 China (#) is the sum of the two.
28The Hoberg and Moon data we employ cover all firms with a machine readable 10-K and also those
without any disclosed offshore activities. Hoberg and Moon (2017) validate their measures with foreign trade
as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, the official source for nation-by-nation U.S. exports and imports.
For both exporting and importing, the correlation of their measures with the export and import value is
above 0.85.
29The Hoberg and Moon data also allow us to distinguish between input-offshoring based on whether
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The global value chain is an entanglement in which products travel different countries
before reaching their final use. Many U.S. firms directly import products from China. But
also products imported from other countries may have been produced by using inputs from
China. For example, a Mexican car parts manufacturer may source some elements from
China, before they sell their product to a U.S. car manufacturer. The Hoberg and Moon
measure thus quantifies each firm’s own perception of the extent to which it is exposed
to China. Hoberg and Moon provide data through 2017. Since then, firms could have
conceivably adjusted their China exposure downward (in light of the trade war). This would
work against finding a negative effect of China exposure in our sample period.
To more generally analyze the effects of firms’ international orientation, not only specifi-
cally with China, we also retrieve the percentage of foreign revenues from the Compustat
Segments database. This measure is available for a somewhat smaller set of observations,
1,839 firms, in our sample. It refers to fiscal year 2017 for 153 firms and to fiscal year 2018
for the remaining 1,686.
To capture heterogeneity in firms’ financial strength, we compute firms’ leverage and
cash holdings based on the accounting data from the latest 2019 quarterly results referring
to periods ending before January 1, 2020.30 Cash/assets is cash and short-term investments,
divided by total assets, in percentage points. Leverage is long-term debt plus debt in current
liabilities, divided by total assets, in percentage points.31 We also consider the short-term
the firm mentions owning physical assets in a given nation. Results, which are available on request, show
that this level of granularity about imports from China does not add significance in explaining differences in
returns.
30All variables in our analyses are, therefore, predetermined for stock returns in the three periods under
consideration. A robustness check shows that our results remain unchanged when using accounting data not
only referring to periods ending before January 1, 2020, but also reported before that date.
31As a robustness check, we also consider Market leverage (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities,
divided by total assets minus book equity plus the market value of common equity) and Net leverage
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and long-term components of debt separately.
Finally, we use three standard control variables. Book-to-market is the book value of
equity divided by market valuation. log(market cap) is the logarithm of the equity market
value as of December 31, 2019. Profitability is the return on assets (in percentage points)
computed as the quarterly income before extraordinary items over total assets.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics. The average firm realized a raw return of minus
38.81% between January 2 and March 20, with effectively all of this drop occurring in the
Fever period. Around 42% of firms report having importing or exporting activities with
China. However, the intensity of these relations (China input (#)) has a standard deviation
of 13.36, a large variability compared to the mean of 5.15. Similarly, the average percentage
of foreign revenues is 27.1%, but the standard deviation is 29.04%. Firms also differ widely
with respect to their financial policies, with the standard deviations of leverage and cash
(22.69% and 25.80%) approximately as large as their means (32.69% and 20.32%).
Table 1 (Descriptive statistics) about here
3.2 Industry-level results
To provide some descriptive background for our main analysis, Figure 2 plots the average
CAPM-adjusted cumulative returns over the full period and in each of the three phases by
GICS industry group.32
Figure 2 (Stock returns by industry) about here
(long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities minus cash and short-term investments, divided by assets)
and obtain very similar results.
32All industries experienced negative raw returns, and the ordering is very similar. These results are
available on request.
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Over the whole period, the Telecom industry did relatively well, as the demand for
services supporting work at home has skyrocketed. Pharma & Biotech and Semiconductors
also performed relatively well, especially in the Fever period.33 Food and Staples Retailing
performed negatively in the Incubation and Outbreak period, but surged in the Fever period,
a striking indication that a broader crisis was anticipated by the market.
Utilities gained strongly in Incubation and Outbreak, arguably because these firms, being
overwhelmingly domestic, do not rely much on global markets, and the demand for their
products was seen not be much affected by the virus. However, in the Fever period, as
investors sold all stocks as the worry of a U.S. recession grew bigger, these low-beta stocks
underperformed.
Over the whole period, Energy, Consumer Services, and Real Estate suffered particularly.
Again, the time pattern is striking. Consumer Services and Real Estate performed neutrally
in Incubation and Outbreak, but severely dropped in Fever as the health crisis in the United
States grew. The Energy sector consists of many oil companies, which would suffer in a
recession. The oil price shock is likely to have additionally hurt these companies, but they
already underperformed strongly in the Incubation and Outbreak periods, as well as in the
first half of the Fever period.
The between-industry differences observed in the Fever period intuitively reflect differential
degrees of disruption in firms’ operations caused by social distancing and lockdown measures.
This intuition is confirmed in the detailed analysis by Pagano, Wagner, and Zechner (2020).
Using measures of the extent to which job activities in different sectors can be carried out
33Donadelli, Kizys, and Riedel (2017) document that pharmaceutical stocks positively respond to the
WHO’s warnings and other disease-related news. Huberman and Regev (2001) instead document that news
related to possible medical breakthroughs is sometimes processed with a very long delay.
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from home and without human interaction in physical proximity (Dingel and Neiman, 2020;
Hensvik, Le Barbanchon, and Rathelot, 2020; Koren and Pető, 2020), they find that industries
more affected in this dimension performed more poorly. All our firm-specific results in the
following also hold accounting for these industry-level measures. We primarily use industry
fixed effects because they pick up all potential drivers of the heterogeneous anticipated impact
of COVID-19 on firms across industries.
3.3 Stock returns and international trade
The COVID-19 crisis began as a real shock to trade. Therefore, this subsection studies
the time pattern in how investors priced international trade of firms. Table 2 summarizes
regressions of returns in the three time periods on international trade exposure and control
variables, in addition to industry fixed effects. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the coefficients,
estimated through 55 regressions of cumulated CAPM-adjusted returns from January 2 up
to each day.
Table 2 (Timing in the pricing of international trade) and Figure 3 (Stock
prices and international trade) about here
Consider first the Incubation and Outbreak periods. As seen in columns 1 through 4
in panel A of Table 2, more mentions of exposure to China resulted in substantially lower
cumulative returns in these periods, net of the effects of other firm characteristics and market
beta. The effects were strongest in Outbreak. For example, the results in column 3 imply that
a one-standard-deviation higher exposure to China (13.36) was associated with 1.36% (= 13.36
× 0.102) lower cumulative returns in the Outbreak period, net of other firm characteristics
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and market beta. Taking into account the descriptive statistics from Table 1, this means
that around 11.8% of a standard deviation of returns in the Outbreak period is explained by
U.S. firm exposure to China.34
When using CAPM-adjusted returns (panel B), we observe that firms exposed to China
suffered already a small, but statistically significant negative response in the Incubation
period. These findings are interesting in light of the fact that firms exporting to China (and
perhaps to a lesser extent those sourcing from China) would arguably have been favored with
the ‘‘Phase 1’’ agreement regarding trade between the United States and China which was
signed on January 15, and which entered into force on February 14. Thus, it is conceivable
that sophisticated investors started pricing-in the concerns about supply chain disruptions
already in the Incubation period. As noted in Section 2, news on the coronavirus were indeed
coming out of China during this period. Concerns about the virus appear to have significantly
outweighed the potential benefits of the trade deal.
Interestingly, column 4 shows that investors penalized not only firms trading with China
but also internationally oriented firms more generally. This result indicates an initial general
pessimism of market participants regarding the disruptive impact of COVID-19 on global
trade. When accounting for the intensity of China exposure, a one-standard-deviation increase
in the share of foreign revenues (29.04) is associated with 1.25% (= 29.04 × 0.043) lower
cumulative returns over the Outbreak period.
34A separate calculation reveals that, in the first two periods combined, firms with any China exposure
(i.e., firms for which either of the two China exposure variables is greater than zero) experienced 2.27%
lower cumulated returns than comparable firms. We have also analyzed export and supply chain exposure
separately. When including both measures, only the output orientation measure is significant. The two
measures are highly correlated.
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With the start of the Fever period, the outlook for the situation in China brightened
relatively to the outlook in other countries. Confirmed cases and deaths fell in China but rose
rapidly in Europe and the United States. Consequently, one would not expect firms exposed
to China to continue their underperformance. Indeed, this is what we find in columns 5 and 6
of panel A. The markets seem to have anticipated the effects of the reopening of the Chinese
economy, and a partial resumption of trade with China.35 The reversal of the trade effects
when the health crisis improved in China and worsened in the United States further supports
the causal interpretation of the relation between stock returns and firm-level measures of
international exposure.
China exposure is even significantly positively associated with CAPM-adjusted returns in
this period (panel B). Investors appear to have effectively sold all stocks in this period. This
led to an unusual underperformance of low-beta stocks in this down market. Conversely,
since stocks with high China-exposure tend to be high-beta, these stocks did relatively better.
Looking at the control variables, we observe that high-profitability firms fared relatively
better in the Fever period. This suggests that investors considered these firms more resilient
to the expected disruption in cash-flows, a theme that previews the role of the financial
strength of a company that is the topic of Section 3.4.
As shown in Table A1 in the Internet Appendix, all our results also hold not controlling
for industry fixed effects. Interestingly, when not controlling for industry, firms and/or
industries with high book-to-market perform poorly in the Fever period. This is as expected,
35Cerdeiro et al. (2020) use machine-learning techniques and maritime data on cargo ship signals to
estimate in real time the effects of COVID-19 on international trade activity. They show that Chinese exports
dramatically fell toward the end of January 2020, but partially resumed again in early March 2020. Our
results show that the stock market anticipated these real consequences by a few weeks each.
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because these firms derive most of their value from relatively near-term cash flows.36
Finally, all our results also hold when explicitly accounting for firm exposures to the
Fama-French factors (see Table A2 in the Internet Appendix).
Overall, the main pattern that emerges from the analyses in this subsection is that China
exposure and international orientation of firms are negatively associated with stock returns
in the Incubation and Outbreak periods, but neutrally or positively so in the Fever period.
These results provide strong evidence of the relevance of international trade for firm value
and point to the disruption of global trade as one initial major economic consequence of
COVID-19.
3.4 Stock returns, debt, and cash holdings
We now turn to how investors perceived debt (leverage) and cash holdings over the three
phases. Columns 1, 4, and 7 in panel A of Table 3 show that during the Incubation and
Outbreak periods, corporate leverage itself does not explain much of the cross-section of
stock returns. However, in the Fever period concerns about corporate debt started playing
a prominent role. In this phase, a one-standard-deviation increase in leverage (22.69%) is
associated with 3.06% (= 22.69 × 0.135) lower cumulative returns, net of the effects of
other firm characteristics and market beta. In other words, almost one sixth of the standard
deviation of returns is explained by leverage. Panel B shows very similar findings when using
CAPM-adjusted returns as dependent variable. As Figure 4 shows, the effect of leverage
36Tsai and Wachter (2016) show how the value premium puzzle (the finding that high book-to-market
stocks have higher average returns than low book-to-market stocks, despite having apparent lower risk) can
be rationalized by the fact that value stocks are likely to underperform during rare disasters, which are too
infrequent to enter standard measures of risk. Relatedly, Zhang (2005) argues that value firms are riskier
than growth firms because assets in place cannot easily be reduced when a recession hits.
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started to be particularly pronounced with the extreme financial turmoil of the week of March
9 and beyond.
Table 3 (Timing in the pricing of debt and cash holdings) and Figure 4 (Stock
prices, debt, and cash holdings) about here
Columns 2, 4, and 6 consider the relevance of corporate cash holdings. Interestingly, this
variable can explain the cross-section of returns already in the Outbreak period, presumably
because of an initial rise in uncertainty amongst investors during this phase. However,
with the start of Fever, the value of cash increased particularly strongly: in this period, a
one-standard-deviation higher cash (25.80%) is associated with approximately 2.99% (=25.80
× 0.112) higher cumulative returns, net of the effects of other firm characteristics and market
beta.
Columns 3, 6, and 9 (both panels A and B) furthermore show that the findings on leverage
and cash holdings are robust to simultaneously testing the significance of the two variables
in the same regression and accounting for firms’ level of international trade.
These results on the benefit of cash holdings in the COVID-19 crisis provide a striking
contrast with the (implicit) cost of holding cash in regular times. To illustrate, in our sample
Cash/assets is negatively correlated with prior profitability (-0.56, statistically significant
at the 1% level). Cash holdings also can be a source of agency costs (e.g., Jensen, 1986;
Harford, 1999; Gao, Harford, and Li, 2013). However, the costs of holding cash represent
a premium that purchases investors insurance against risks that are otherwise difficult to
hedge.37 Intuitively, high-cash firms are more likely able to survive and to preserve their
37Indeed, cash-rich firms tend to be precisely those with higher cash flow volatility (Bates, Kahle, and
Stulz, 2009) and higher market beta (Palazzo, 2012), that is, those with higher exposure to conventional
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physical and human capital, and they also will be in a better position to undertake new
investments in the recovery phase.38 Overall, investors perceived the cash holdings of these
firms as conveying a net advantage to cope with the real effects of the pandemic.
Moreover, the surge in the value of cash also suggests that as the crisis unfolded investors
became increasingly concerned about a tightening of firms’ access to external finance. A
temporary shortage of cash should not be a major concern per se if firms can continue relying
on capital markets to raise cash and roll over existing debt.39 However, as shown in Table 4
in columns 1 and 2, we find that the effect of leverage on the stock performance in the Fever
period interacts positively with the effect of cash holdings (contrary to what happens in
previous periods). This result clearly indicates that investors perceived cash to be particularly
valuable for firms expected to have the biggest problems accessing external capital in the
worsened macroeconomic environment.40
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 provide further support of the idea of an anticipated tightening
of financial frictions. Here, we include the interaction effect between leverage and book-to-
market. The negative coefficient on this interaction term indicates that in the Fever period
investors perceived high corporate debt as particularly problematic for higher book-to-market
firms, that is for firms deriving most of their value from near-future cash flows. Conversely,
business risks.
38De Vito and Gomez (2020) stress test the liquidity ratios of a global sample of listed firms. For example,
if sales drop by 75%, an average firm with partial operating flexibility would exhaust its cash holdings in
about two years, and one-tenth of firms would become illiquid in six months.
39See Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Opler et al. (1999) for discussions on the relation between the
marginal value of corporate cash holdings and firm access to capital markets.
40Consistently with this interpretation, Acharya and Steffen (2020) document, using data on daily credit
line drawdowns at the firm-loan level, that from March 1 through April 9, 2020, the lowest-rated investment-
grade (BBB) firms accumulated cash by extensively drawing down their bank credit lines, whereas high-quality
investment-grade firms (AAA-A) increased their bond issuance activities. Relatedly, Halling, Yu, and Zechner
(2020) show that bond issues increased substantially during the COVID crisis, but especially so for bonds
rated A or higher.
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high debt was considered less of a problem for ‘‘growth’’ firms, whose value (and, therefore,
also ability to repay) derives mostly from a more distant future. It is worth noticing here that
most of the stock-price effect of leverage during the Fever period derives from long-term debt
(its most important component), rather than from short-term debt (see columns 3 and 6).
Apparently, especially so for value firms investors worried more about the obstacles created
by high long-term debt in accessing new external funding, rather than about the extra cash
needed to repay debt in the short run.
Table 4 (Interacting leverage with cash holdings and book-to-market) about
here
Finally, the graphs in Figure 5 plot the average CAPM-adjusted returns in the Fever
period by GICS industry group against the coefficients on leverage and cash holdings estimated
through industry-specific regressions of CAPM-adjusted returns over the same period. These
graphs offer two additional insights. First, the coefficients on leverage and cash holdings have
the same sign in most industries, confirming the importance of these corporate dimensions
throughout the U.S. economy, not just in a few isolated sectors. Second, the two financial
policy dimensions are quantitatively more important within industries more heavily affected
by COVID-19 in terms of negative stock returns, which anticipate real economic impacts.
Figure 5 (Effects of leverage and cash across industries) about here
As in the previous section, all our results also hold not controlling for industry fixed effects
(see Table A1 in the Internet Appendix) and explicitly accounting for exposure to the Fama-
French factors (see Table A2 in the Internet Appendix), though using Fama-French-adjusted
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returns the effect of cash is not statistically significant. This latter result is explained by
the strong negative correlation between cash holdings and exposure to the value factor (see
the discussion in Section 3.1.1 and Figure A2 in the Internet Appendix). Given that the
value factor is on average negative in the Fever period (-0.81), using Fama-French-adjusted
returns understates the relative performance of high-cash firms.
Overall, these results highlight the importance of a strong financial position of a company
as a matter of preparedness for (disaster) risks. The timing in the pricing of corporate leverage
and liquidity suggests that in the Fever period investors started looking at COVID-19 as a
catalyst for a recession amplified by financial channels.
4 Manager and Analyst Communications
This section shows that the relevance of international trade and financial strength in the
Outbreak and Fever periods is visible not only through the lens of stock returns but also in
managerial and analyst communication on corporate conference calls.41
4.1 Data
The conference call transcripts are obtained from Refinitiv / Thomson Reuters Streetevents.
The sample consists of a total of 2,736 conference calls (both earnings conference calls and
other calls, such as a roadshow presentations and investor conferences) of 1,945 nonfinancial
Russell 3000 constituents held between January 20 and March 20, 2020. (We exclude calls
41Thus, we focus on communication about COVID-19 during the crisis. It is also interesting to analyze
communication about pandemic risks before they materialize. For example, Hassan et al. (2020) study the
contents of earning calls of listed firms across the globe to develop measures of firms’ exposure to epidemic
diseases. Loughran and McDonald (2020) examine all 2018 10-K filings of U.S. firms, and find that only
around one-fifth of them contain any reference to pandemic-related terms.
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of financial firms for the sake of consistency with the stock return results.) This analysis
concerns calls held in the Outbreak and Fever period, because no conference call in the
Incubation period discussed the coronavirus (see Section 2).
We preprocessed the conference call transcripts for natural language processing by per-
forming standard cleanup tasks: remove special characters and punctuation; eliminate stop
words; and perform lemmatization. Negativity is the frequency of negative words on the
Loughran and McDonald (2011) word list in the conference call.
Summary statistics of the conference call variables used in this section are reported in
Table 5.
Table 5 (Descriptive statistics of conference calls) about here
4.2 Results
On average, as one would expect, firms on whose calls the coronavirus was not discussed
have higher average cumulative returns over the whole period. However, consistent with the
fact that some firms are more negatively affected than others, the distributions of cumulative
abnormal returns over the whole period for firms discussing the coronavirus on a conference
call and for firms not discussing it overlap.42
Panel A of Table 6 analyzes the characteristics of firms more likely to talk about COVID-
19.43 Columns 1, 3, and 5 present results of logit regressions showing that a call is more
42See Figure A3 in the Internet Appendix. Results available on request show that all findings developed
in the prior sections on stock price reactions hold controlling for whether a firm held a conference call that
included a discussion of COVID-19.
43This analysis is performed within industries. Panel A of Figure A4 in the Internet Appendix shows the
percentage of calls mentioning the coronavirus in the Outbreak and Fever periods by industry.
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likely to discuss this topic when a firm has more international exposure. Analyses available
on request show that these results (and those that follow) also hold when using China (#)
as the explanatory variable of interest.
Table 6 (Talking about COVID-19 and firm characteristics) about here
Next, columns 2, 4, and 6 show that similar results obtain on the intensive margin: the
coronavirus and related issues occur more frequently on calls in firms with stronger reliance
on international trade. Similarly, conference calls of firms with a potentially higher liquidity
concern (that is, lower cash holdings) are more likely to feature a discussion of COVID-19.
Panel B of Table 6 shows variation, over time, of factors explaining the number of
mentions of COVID-19-related terms in analyst questions. While overall and in the Outbreak
period, analysts’ concerns were mostly focused on international trade (columns 1 and 3),
this variable was somewhat less important in the Fever period (column 5); by contrast, the
liquidity position of the firm only drove analysts’ questions about COVID-19 in the Fever
period, not before.
Finally, we consider negativity of calls featuring a discussion of the coronavirus. As one
would expect, calls covering the coronavirus are on average more negative than calls not
covering it; specifically, they have 0.15 (equal to one quarter of the standard deviation)
higher negativity (p-value<.001). Panel B of Figure A4 in the Internet Appendix shows the
average negativity of calls that mentioned the coronavirus by industry. Interestingly, the
figure displays a pattern of ‘‘winning’’ and ‘‘losing’’ industries generally in line with the one
observed in Figure 2 with respect to cumulative abnormal returns.
What explains negativity? Columns 2, 4, and 6 of panel B of Table 6 show the results.
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Over the Outbreak and Fever period combined (column 2), negativity is higher in firms with
stronger international orientation and higher leverage. However, international orientation
only drove up negativity in the Outbreak phase (column 4), whereas leverage only explains
negativity in the Fever phase (column 6). Consistent with this picture, Table A3 in the
Internet Appendix shows that the higher average negativity of calls covering COVID-19,
compared to those not covering it, is mainly driven by differences across firms in international
trade in the Outbreak period, and by financial leverage in the Fever period. All these results
align well with the pattern observed above for the drivers of the cross-section of stock returns.
Overall, these results confirm that international trade and the financial strength of
companies were of significant concern to managers and analysts at different times, providing
further support for the result that these factors play an important role in explaining the
cross-section of stock price reactions.
5 Policy Interventions
The aim of this paper is to diagnose the impact of the emergence of COVID-19 on individual
stocks. A detailed evaluation of policy interventions and their long-term effects will be the
subject of future studies. However, the interventions by the Federal Reserve Board (Fed)
deployed in the week of March 23 provide an early opportunity for an out-of-sample test of our
main results. Specifically, on Monday, March 23 the Fed announced two new facilities---the
‘‘Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility’’ and the ‘‘Secondary Market Corporate Credit
Facility’’---to support credit to large corporations at least up to the end of Q3 2020.
The Fed’s announcement to purchase newly issued bonds and loans on the primary market
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can be expected to support firms running low on cash because it means that they can effectively
raise funds immediately from the Fed. The announcement to purchase outstanding corporate
bonds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) on the secondary market can be expected to support
firms with high leverage. Consistent with these expectations, as indicated in columns 1--3
of Table 7, in the days immediately following the Fed’s announcement the cross-sectional
stock price reactions that had taken place in the Fever period partially reversed. Specifically,
regressions of cumulative abnormal returns in a 3-day event window (from March 23 through
March 25) on Leverage and Cash/assets yield coefficients of +0.092 (highly significant) and
-0.031 (just below conventional significance levels), respectively. These coefficients can be
compared to the effects observed in the Fever period, namely, the coefficients of -0.135 and
+0.112 in columns 7 and 8 of panel A of Table 3.
Table 7 (Effects of the Fed intervention) about here
However, the reversal was only temporary. Columns 4--6 of Table 7 extend the event
window from 3 to 10 days. The effects of Leverage and Cash/assets resumed the direction
they had exhibited in the Fever period so far. By market close on April 3, 2020, the negative
effect of leverage and the positive effect of cash on cumulative stock returns were significantly
higher than they were two weeks before at the end of the Fever period. This is noteworthy
also in light of the fact that on March 27 the U.S. President signed a US$2 trillion relief bill
into law (CARES Act).44 The additional bad news regarding the further spread of COVID-19
appear to have dominated investor expectations.45
44Support for this bill grew over the course of a longer time period, and in the morning hours of March 25
it became clear that there was bipartisan agreement in Congress.
45Figure A5 in the Internet Appendix shows the evolution of the coefficients on leverage and cash holdings
when also including the period after the Fed’s intervention analyzed in this section.
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Thus, the unprecedented liquidity programs announced by the Fed in late March 2020
may have temporarily mitigated the symptoms of the crisis, but investors did not immediately
perceive them as a cure. The concerns regarding corporate leverage and liquidity remained
high. Presumably, one reason for the persisting concerns is that the Fed’s purchasing
programs were initially intended to cover only bonds of investment-grade firms, that is, the
debt of relatively low-leveraged firms that the markets had already perceived less likely to face
restrictions in continuing tapping external capital. On April 9, 2020, the Fed announced a
significant expansion of both its primary and secondary market facilities. First, the programs
now also cover bonds of firms downgraded to high yield after March 22, 2020 (the so-called
‘‘fallen angels’’). Second, the Fed can now also buy high-yield exchange-traded funds (ETFs).
The future will reveal the long-term effects of these and other interventions.
6 Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic represents a fearsome and unprecedented challenge for individuals,
policy makers, and investors. This paper presents the first analysis of how investors assessed
the consequences of this tail risk event for individual companies.
As the disease spread, the market responded by weighing the economic consequences. We
find strong causal evidence for the role of international trade and global value chains for
corporate value: initially, as China was effectively shut down, investors shunned U.S. stocks
with China exposure and internationally oriented companies; as the virus situation in China
improved relative to the situation in Europe and in the United States, investors perceived
those companies more favorably again. As the virus spread in Europe and in the United
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States, leading to lockdowns in these economies, markets moved feverishly. However, the
cross-section of returns exhibited clear patterns. Investors (and analysts) became concerned
about high corporate debt and about the survival chances of firms with little cash. While
cash holdings are expensive for companies in general (in terms of opportunity costs, and
due to the potential for agency problems), the emergence of this pandemic highlights the
importance of precautionary cash holdings for firm value.
Overall, the findings vividly illustrate that stock market participants anticipated the real
economic effects of the COVID-19 health crisis to be amplified by financial channels. At
this point, it is unknown whether the combination of the ongoing policy interventions and
individual behavior changes will achieve the desired goal of stabilizing the situation, and
ultimately healing the economic wounds inflicted by the virus. Even if they do, investors will
presumably continue to keep an eye on a potential resurgence of COVID-19, the emergence
of future pandemics, and perhaps even disaster risks more generally. The learnings on the
dependence of firms on trade linkages and the importance of a strong financial position as a
matter of preparedness if a calamity strikes remain relevant also prospectively.
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Figure 1: Attention to the coronavirus in the United States
This chart shows the total number of U.S. firms’ conference calls held on each day from
January 2 through March 20, for a total of 4,260 individual calls. The orange bars represent
the number of calls mentioning at least one of the following terms: ‘‘coronavirus,’’ ‘‘covid-19,”
‘‘2019-ncov,’’ ‘‘sars-cov-2.’’ The chart also shows (right y-axis) the daily U.S.-specific Google
Trends search value index for the term ‘‘coronavirus’’ from January 1, 2020, through March
20, 2020. The index varies from 0 to 100 and represents search interest relative to the highest
point in the period.
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Figure 2: Stock returns by industry
This figure shows the average equally weighted cumulative abnormal returns by GICS
industry group from January 2 through March 20, 2020 (the first bar for each industry) and
the cumulative abnormal returns over the three subperiods: Incubation (from January 2
through January 17, 2020), Outbreak (from January 20 (effectively January 21 as January
20 was a holiday) through February 21, 2020), and Fever (from February 24 through March
20, 2020). The sample consists of Russell 3000 constituents. CAPM-adjusted returns are the
daily excess returns on the stock minus beta times the market excess return.
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Figure 3: Stock prices and international trade
This graph shows the evolution of the coefficients on China (#) and Foreign revenues in
regressions with the CAPM-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns of U.S. stocks from January
2, 2020, each day through March 20, 2020, as the dependent variable. The regressions control
for GICS industry group indicators and firm characteristics (log(market cap), profitability,
and market-to-book). China (#) is the number of times a firms mentions China in relation to
importing or exporting activities in their 2017 10-K. These data come from Hoberg and Moon
(2017, 2019). Foreign revenues is the percentage of non-U.S. revenues. The sample comprises
Russell 3000 nonfinancial constituents. The red, vertical lines represent the beginning of the
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Figure 4: Stock prices, debt, and cash holdings
This graph shows the evolution of the coefficients on Leverage and Cash/assets in regressions
with the CAPM-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns of U.S. stocks from January 2, 2020,
each day through March 20, 2020, as the dependent variable. The regressions control for
GICS industry group indicators and firm characteristics (log(market cap), profitability, and
market-to-book). Leverage is the percentage of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities
over total assets: [(dltt + dlc)*100/at]. Cash/assets is the percentage of cash and short-term
investments over total assets (che*100/at). The sample consists of Russell 3000 nonfinancial
constituents. The red, vertical lines represent the beginning of the Outbreak and Fever
periods, respectively.
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Figure 5: Value of leverage and cash against industry-level stock returns
These graphs plot the average equally weighted CAPM-adjusted cumulative returns in the
Fever period (February 24 through March 20, 2020) by GICS industry group against the
coefficients on Leverage (top) and Cash/assets (bottom) estimated through industry-specific
regressions of CAPM-adjusted cumulative returns over the same period. The regressions
control for firm characteristics (log(market cap), profitability, and market-to-book). The
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
This table shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses. The sample
consists of Russell 3000 nonfinancial constituents with available data. Returns (adjusted for
stock splits and dividends) are computed based on stock prices retrieved from the Compustat
North-America database. To compute CAPM-adjusted returns, we first estimate each stock’s
market beta by regressing its daily excess returns from January 2, 2019, through December
31, 2019, on a constant and the daily value-weighted market return (in excess of the daily
U.S. 1-month Treasury-bill rate). CAPM-adjusted returns are the daily excess returns on
the stock minus beta times the market excess return. China offshoring data come from
Hoberg and Moon (2017, 2019) and refer to 2017 (the latest available year). China (1/0)
is a dummy variable equal to one for firms with activities with China. China (#) is the
number of times a firm mentions China in their 10-K in relation to importing or exporting
activities. Foreign revenues is obtained from the Compustat Segments database and is the
percentage (truncated at 100) of non-U.S. revenues in 2017 (153 firms) or 2018 (1,686 firms).
Accounting data are computed based on the results of the latest 2019 quarter ending before
January 1, 2020, retrieved from Compustat on February 20, 2020 (mostly Q3 2019). Leverage
is the percentage of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities over total assets: [(dltt
+ dlc)*100/at], truncated at 100. Leverage (short) and Leverage (long) consider debt in
current liabilities and long-term debt, respectively, over total assets. Cash/assets is cash and
cash equivalents over total assets, in percentage points (che*100/at). Book-to-market is the
book value of equity divided by market valuation. log(market cap) is the logarithm of the
equity market capitalization as of December 31, 2019. Profitability is the return on assets (in
percentage) computed as the quarterly income before extraordinary items over total assets.
N Min p25 Mean p50 p75 Max SD
Raw returns
Jan02-Mar20 2,349 -93.43 -53.17 -38.81 -39.65 -25.72 278.88 24.07
Jan02-Jan17 (Incubation) 2,350 -48.67 -2.46 2.02 1.81 5.79 96.69 9.99
Jan20-Feb21 (Outbreak) 2,346 -60.05 -9.79 -2.04 -2.17 5.08 215.04 16.01
Feb24-Mar20 (Fever) 2,348 -88.03 -50.79 -39.06 -38.50 -27.71 209.57 19.71
CAPM-adjusted returns
Jan02-Mar20 2,349 -90.79 -31.43 -10.05 -13.08 6.05 430.43 35.97
Jan02-Jan17 (Incubation) 2,350 -50.77 -6.07 -1.62 -1.38 2.55 88.37 9.82
Jan20-Feb21 (Outbreak) 2,346 -60.64 -10.49 -2.75 -2.87 4.44 207.20 15.89
Jan20-Feb21 (Fever) 2,348 -82.46 -26.12 -5.72 -7.38 10.99 354.65 32.49
Market beta 2,350 -0.87 0.81 1.14 1.13 1.47 5.62 0.52
Firm characteristics
China (1/0) 2,078 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49
China (#) 2,078 0.00 0.00 5.25 0.00 4.00 161.00 13.36
Foreign revenues 1,839 0.00 0.00 27.08 18.66 46.80 100.00 29.04
Leverage 2,339 0.00 14.22 32.69 32.13 46.83 100.00 22.69
Leverage (short) 2,339 0.00 0.49 3.10 1.37 3.71 92.52 5.35
Leverage (long) 2,349 0.00 11.71 29.98 28.86 43.16 100.00 22.12
Cash/assets 2,350 0.00 2.61 20.32 8.47 26.48 99.42 25.80
Book-to-market 2,350 -44.91 0.17 0.49 0.35 0.63 15.20 1.26
log(market cap) 2,350 16.35 20.14 21.46 21.35 22.57 27.92 1.76
Profitability 2,350 -30.46 -0.88 -0.98 0.69 1.71 7.85 5.98
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Table 2: Timing in the pricing of international trade
This table shows results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of individual stock
returns in three time periods (indicated in the column headers), on variables measuring
international trade and standard firm characteristics (size, profitability, and book-to-market).
The dependent variables are cumulative (raw) returns in panel A (including market beta
as an additional firm control) and CAPM-adjusted cumulative returns in panel B. (As a
robustness check, Table A2 in the Internet Appendix reports the results when using Fama-
French-adjusted factors.) China (#) is the number of times a firm mentions China in their
10-K in relation to importing or exporting activities. Foreign revenues is the percentage of
non-U.S. revenues. All models also control for GICS industry group fixed effect indicators.
The sample consists of nonfinancial Russell 3000 constituents. t-statistics based on robust
standard errors in parentheses. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01.
Incubation Outbreak Fever
Jan02-Jan17 Jan20-Feb21 Feb24-Mar20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Dependent variable: Cumulative returns
China (#) -0.011 -0.011 -0.102*** -0.074*** 0.035 0.048
(-0.92) (-0.76) (-4.06) (-2.76) (1.17) (1.47)
Foreign revenues -0.000 -0.043*** -0.014
(-0.00) (-2.85) (-0.75)
Market beta -1.237** -0.785 -3.080*** -3.593*** -6.722*** -6.963***
(-2.21) (-1.35) (-3.42) (-3.62) (-6.34) (-5.98)
log(market cap) 0.364*** 0.492*** 0.515** 0.806*** 0.311 0.401*
(2.82) (3.18) (2.26) (3.44) (1.43) (1.66)
Profitability -0.187*** -0.194** -0.012 -0.066 0.199** 0.393***
(-2.82) (-2.17) (-0.09) (-0.33) (2.06) (3.12)
Book-to-market 0.048 0.217 -0.491 -0.507 -0.842 -1.089*
(0.11) (0.58) (-0.95) (-1.03) (-1.17) (-1.71)
Observations 2,078 1,701 2,074 1,698 2,076 1,699
R-squared .136 .166 .119 .143 .222 .245
B. Dependent variable: CAPM-adjusted cumulative returns
China (#) -0.024* -0.020 -0.112*** -0.083*** 0.118** 0.118**
(-1.96) (-1.37) (-4.42) (-3.03) (2.52) (2.26)
Foreign revenues -0.005 -0.047*** 0.006
(-0.40) (-3.10) (0.22)
log(market cap) 0.508*** 0.625*** 0.653*** 0.969*** -0.469 -0.365
(4.00) (4.19) (2.87) (4.13) (-1.19) (-0.87)
Profitability -0.131** -0.137 0.031 -0.012 -0.008 0.253
(-2.06) (-1.63) (0.24) (-0.06) (-0.05) (1.22)
Book-to-market 0.014 0.208 -0.494 -0.480 -1.347 -2.021
(0.03) (0.51) (-0.86) (-0.88) (-0.76) (-1.31)
Observations 2,078 1,701 2,074 1,698 2,076 1,699
R-squared .141 .173 .116 .139 .235 .236
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3: Timing in the pricing of debt and cash holdings
This table shows results of OLS regressions of individual stock returns in three time periods
(indicated in the column headers), on leverage, cash holdings, and standard firm characteristics
(size, profitability, and book-to-market). The dependent variables are cumulative (raw)
returns in panel A (including market beta as an additional firm control) and CAPM-adjusted
cumulative returns in panel B. (As a robustness check, Table A2 in the Internet Appendix
reports the results when using Fama-French-adjusted factors.) Leverage is the percentage of
long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities over total assets. Cash/assets is the percentage
of cash and cash equivalents, divided by total assets. Regressions in columns 3, 6, and 9 also
control for Foreign revenues. All models also control for GICS industry group fixed effect
indicators. The sample consists of nonfinancial Russell 3000 constituents. t-statistics based
on robust standard errors in parentheses. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01.
Incubation Outbreak Fever
Jan02-Jan17 Jan20-Feb21 Feb24-Mar20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Dependent variable: Cumulative returns
Leverage 0.013 0.014 0.006 0.006 -0.135*** -0.140***
(0.96) (0.87) (0.30) (0.28) (-6.85) (-6.59)
Cash/assets 0.009 0.043** 0.053** 0.086*** 0.112*** 0.104***
(0.66) (2.51) (2.51) (3.24) (4.82) (3.95)
Foreign -0.008 -0.062*** 0.002
revenues (-0.73) (-4.57) (0.10)
Market -1.532*** -1.484*** -1.149* -2.495*** -2.438*** -3.642*** -5.033*** -5.885*** -5.794***
beta (-2.79) (-2.73) (-1.90) (-3.07) (-2.97) (-3.82) (-5.17) (-5.98) (-5.11)
Observations 2,339 2,350 1,829 2,335 2,346 1,826 2,337 2,348 1,827
R-squared .136 .136 .177 .118 .121 .151 .206 .196 .282
B. Dependent variable: CAPM-adjusted cumulative returns
Leverage 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.156*** -0.159***
(0.23) (0.20) (-0.05) (-0.20) (-5.05) (-4.71)
Cash/assets 0.007 0.030* 0.051** 0.072*** 0.185*** 0.229***
(0.50) (1.81) (2.46) (2.83) (4.57) (5.10)
Foreign -0.014 -0.069*** 0.043
revenues (-1.42) (-5.00) (1.61)
Observations 2,339 2,350 1,829 2,335 2,346 1,826 2,337 2,348 1,827
R-squared .139 .139 .182 .116 .120 .147 .211 .212 .262
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4: Interacting leverage with cash holdings and book-to-market
This table shows results of OLS regressions of individual stock returns in the Fever period
(February 24 through March 20, 2020) on leverage, cash holdings, and the interactions between
leverage and cash, and leverage and book-to-market. The dependent variables are cumulative
(raw) returns in columns 1 to 3 (including market beta as an additional firm control) and
CAPM-adjusted cumulative returns in columns 4 to 6. All models control for GICS industry
group fixed effect indicators and standard firm characteristics (size, profitability, and book-
to-market). The sample consists of nonfinancial Russell 3000 constituents. t-statistics based
on robust standard errors in parentheses. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01.
Dependent variable: Cumulative returns in Fever Cumulative CAPM-adj returns in Fever
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leverage -0.171*** -0.093*** -0.168*** -0.059*
(-7.22) (-4.31) (-4.25) (-1.68)
Cash/assets 0.011 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.087* 0.186*** 0.184***
(0.37) (3.34) (3.31) (1.68) (4.44) (4.38)
Leverage × 0.002*** 0.002*
Cash/assets (2.85) (1.65)
Leverage × -0.057*** -0.141***
Book-to-market (-4.05) (-4.86)
Leverage (long) -0.094*** -0.061*
(-4.12) (-1.71)
Leverage (long) × -0.051*** -0.124***
Book-to-market (-3.65) (-4.24)
Leverage (short) -0.046 0.012
(-0.50) (0.08)
Leverage (short) × -0.164 -0.414
Book-to-market (-1.02) (-1.27)
Market beta -5.062*** -5.765*** -5.779***
(-5.18) (-5.91) (-5.87)
Observations 2,337 2,337 2,337 2,337 2,337 2,337
R-squared .212 .217 .218 .216 .236 .237
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of conference calls
This table shows descriptive statistics of the conference call variables used in regressions
in Table 6. The sample consists of 2,736 conference calls of 1,945 nonfinancial Russell
3000 constituents held between January 20 and March 20, 2020. COVID-19 (0/1) is a
dummy variable equal to one for calls mentioning coronavirus-related terms (‘‘coronavirus,’’
‘‘covid-19,” ‘‘2019-ncov,’’ ‘‘sars-cov-2’’). COVID-19 (#) is the number of coronavirus-related
mentions in the call. COVID-19 questions is the number of coronavirus-related mentions by
financial analysts. Call negativity is the relative frequency of negative words based on the
Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary covering coronavirus, expressed as percentage
points.
N Min p25 Mean p50 p75 Max SD
COVID-19 (0/1) 2,736 0.00 0.00 0.53 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50
COVID-19 (#) 2,736 0.00 0.00 2.19 1.00 3.00 52.00 3.61
COVID-19 questions 2,736 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.00 1.00 19.00 1.18
Call negativity 2,736 0.16 1.32 1.72 1.65 2.04 4.42 0.57
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Table 6: Talking about COVID-19
This table shows results of analyses of the relation between firms’ characteristics and coverage
of COVID-19 in conference calls during the Outbreak and Fever periods. In panel A, columns
1, 3, and 5 show logit regressions of an indicator equal to one for coronavirus-covering
conference calls on variables measuring capital structure and international trade. Columns 2,
4, and 6 show results of OLS regressions of the number of coronavirus-related mentions on firm
characteristics. In panel B, columns 1, 3, and 5 show OLS regression results of the number
of coronavirus-related analyst questions on firm characteristics. Columns 2, 4, and 6 show
results of OLS regressions of call negativity on firm characteristics, for coronavirus-covering
calls. Our definition of negativity follows that of Loughran and McDonald (2011). All models
control for GICS industry group fixed effect indicators and standard firm characteristics
(size, profitability, and book-to-market). The sample includes conference calls of nonfinancial
Russell 3000 constituents held between January 20 and March 20, 2020. t-statistics based
on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p
<.01.
Outbreak + Fever Outbreak Fever
Jan20-Mar20 Jan20-Feb21 Feb24-Mar20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Talking about COVID-19
Dependent variable: COVID-19 COVID-19 COVID-19 COVID-19 COVID-19 COVID-19
(0/1) (#) (0/1) (#) (0/1) (#)
Foreign revenues 0.024*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.020*** 0.034***
(9.44) (8.79) (8.61) (7.79) (5.22) (5.30)
Leverage 0.002 0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.001
(0.82) (0.91) (-0.49) (-1.00) (-1.02) (0.10)
Cash/assets -0.007** -0.011** -0.013** -0.009* -0.008* -0.015**
(-2.26) (-2.31) (-2.38) (-1.78) (-1.70) (-2.22)
Observations 2,242 2,242 1,176 1,176 1,032 1,066
Pseudo-R-squared .093 .159 .089
R-squared .104 .177 .128
B. Analyst questions and linguistic tone of call content
Dependent variable: COVID-19 Call COVID-19 Call COVID-19 Call
questions negativity questions negativity questions negativity
Foreign revenues 0.008*** 0.002*** 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.005** 0.002
(5.51) (3.19) (5.96) (3.63) (2.36) (1.59)
Leverage 0.000 0.002* -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.003**
(0.07) (1.69) (-0.19) (-0.47) (-0.61) (2.47)
Cash/assets -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.005* -0.000
(-1.19) (-0.41) (-0.16) (-0.77) (-1.87) (-0.28)
Observations 2,242 1,214 1,176 488 1,066 726
R-squared .058 .151 .139 .195 .075 .178
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: Effects of the Fed’s intervention
This table shows results of OLS regressions of CAPM-adjusted returns in the post-analysis
period, on leverage, cash holdings, and standard firm characteristics (size, profitability, and
book-to-market). The dependent variables are cumulative (raw) returns in panel A (including
market beta as an additional control) and CAPM-adjusted cumulative returns in panel B.
Columns 1 to 3 look at the returns over a 3-day window after the Fed’s intervention on
March 23, 2020. Columns 4 to 6 cover the entire period from March 23 through April 3,
2020. Cash/assets is the percentage of cash and cash equivalents, divided by total assets.
Leverage is the percentage of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities over total assets.
All models also control for GICS industry group fixed effect indicators. The sample consists
of nonfinancial Russell 3000 constituents. t-statistics based on robust standard errors in
parentheses. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01.
March23-March25 (3-day window) March23-April03 (10-day window)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Dependent variable: Cumulative returns
Leverage 0.092*** 0.099*** -0.036** -0.017
(5.45) (4.83) (-1.98) (-0.80)
Cash/assets -0.031 0.025 0.081*** 0.122***
(-1.61) (1.03) (4.07) (4.70)
Foreign revenues 0.004 0.026
(0.26) (1.49)
Market beta 0.860 1.422 0.530 -5.017*** -5.247*** -6.434***
(0.98) (1.59) (0.47) (-5.04) (-5.32) (-5.28)
Observations 2,338 2,349 1,828 2,330 2,341 1,824
R-squared .146 .133 .160 .121 .124 .145
B. Dependent variable: CAPM-adjusted cumulative returns
Leverage 0.073*** 0.077*** -0.053*** -0.044**
(4.46) (3.86) (-2.99) (-2.02)
Cash/assets -0.035* -0.002 0.061*** 0.066**
(-1.84) (-0.08) (3.02) (2.53)
Foreign revenues -0.007 0.003
(-0.46) (0.20)
Observations 2,338 2,349 1,828 2,330 2,341 1,824
R-squared .161 .154 .169 .128 .125 .139
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Internet Appendix
Figure A1: Global attention to the coronavirus
This chart shows the total number of international firms’ conference calls held on each day
from January 2 through March 20, for a total of 7,698 individual calls. The orange bars
indicate the number of calls at least mentioning one of these terms: ‘‘coronavirus,’’ ‘‘covid-19,”
‘‘2019-ncov,’’ ‘‘sars-cov-2.’’ The chart also shows (right y-axis) the daily worldwide Google
Trends search value index for the term ‘‘coronavirus’’ from January 1, 2020, through March
20, 2020. The index varies from 0 to 100 and represents search interest relative to the highest
point in the period.
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Figure A2: Firm-level variables and Fama-French factor loadings
Binned scatter plots of loadings on (from left to right) Fama-French market, size, and value
factor returns against firm Foreign revenues (upper graphs), Leverage, and Cash/assets
(bottom graphs). The plots control for industry fixed effects. The factor loadings are
computed by regressing firms’ daily excess returns from January 2, 2019 through December
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Figure A3: Conference calls and stock price performance
This figure shows histograms of cumulative abnormal returns for the period January 2, 2020,
through March 20, 2020, for U.S. firms that mentioned coronavirus in a conference call after
January 20 (green) and for firms that did not (transparent). The sample consists of Russell
3000 nonfinancial constituents that hold a conference call between January 20 and March 20,
2020. We define calls mentioning coronavirus as calls at least mentioning one of these terms:
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Figure A4: Coronavirus and conference call negativity by industry
In this figure, the top chart shows the percentage of conference calls by GICS industry
group including at least one of these terms: ‘‘coronavirus,’’ ‘‘covid-19,’’ ‘‘2019-ncov,’’ or
‘‘sars-cov-2.’’ The bottom chart shows the average equally weighted negativity of conference
calls mentioning coronavirus by GICS industry group. Negativity is the frequency of negative
words based on the Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary, expressed as percentage
points. The sample consists of conference calls of Russell 3000 nonfinancial constituents held
between January 20 and March 20, 2020.
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Figure A5: Stock prices and financial policies after the Fed’s intervention
This graph shows the evolution of the coefficients on Leverage and Cash/assets in regressions
with the CAPM-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns of U.S. stocks from January 2, 2020,
each day through April 3, 2020, as the dependent variable. The regressions control for
GICS industry group indicators and firm characteristics (log(market cap), profitability, and
market-to-book). The sample consists of Russell 3000 nonfinancial constituents. The red,
vertical lines mark the beginning of the Outbreak and Fever periods, respectively. The dotted
black, vertical line marks the day of the policy intervention by the Federal Reserve Board
(Fed).
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Table A1: Robustness check: Not controlling for industry fixed effects
This table shows results of OLS regressions of individual stock returns in three time periods
(indicated in the column headers), on firm-level variable of interest (China exposure, foreign
revenues, leverage, and cash holdings). The dependent variables are cumulative (raw)
returns in panel A (including market beta as an additional firm control) and CAPM-
adjusted cumulative returns in panel B. All models control for standard firm characteristics
(size, profitability, and book-to-market). The sample consists of nonfinancial Russell 3000




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Dependent variable: Cumulative returns
China (#) -0.019 -0.065** 0.029
(-1.17) (-2.51) (1.03)
Foreign revenues 0.024** 0.013 -0.033** -0.053*** 0.044** 0.031**
(2.05) (1.34) (-2.36) (-4.30) (2.48) (2.05)
Leverage 0.011 0.024 -0.176***
(0.72) (1.17) (-8.24)
Cash/assets 0.107*** 0.142*** 0.176***
(5.80) (5.92) (7.13)
Market beta -0.872 -1.727*** -5.139*** -5.755*** -6.823*** -7.763***
(-1.60) (-3.16) (-6.26) (-7.21) (-6.38) (-7.51)
log(market cap) 0.547*** 0.527*** 0.905*** 1.035*** 0.814*** 1.081***
(3.28) (3.37) (3.69) (4.41) (3.13) (4.37)
Profitability -0.277*** -0.075 -0.203 0.076 -0.079 0.138
(-2.70) (-0.93) (-0.97) (0.46) (-0.60) (1.25)
Book-to-market -0.318 -0.247 -1.168 -0.967 -1.797*** -1.719***
(-0.48) (-0.42) (-1.54) (-1.59) (-4.03) (-2.62)
Observations 1,701 1,829 1,698 1,826 1,699 1,827
R-squared .031 .073 .075 .102 .068 .165
Industry FE No No No No No No
B. Dependent variable: CAPM-adjusted cumulative returns
China (#) -0.027* -0.077*** 0.088*
(-1.67) (-2.92) (1.78)
Foreign revenues 0.005 -0.009 -0.057*** -0.080*** 0.169*** 0.144***
(0.51) (-1.00) (-4.27) (-6.99) (5.99) (6.24)
Leverage 0.006 0.018 -0.244***
(0.42) (0.87) (-7.35)
Cash/assets 0.083*** 0.115*** 0.362***
(4.64) (4.87) (8.06)
Observations 1,701 1,829 1,698 1,826 1,699 1,827
R-squared .029 .056 .052 .073 .054 .161
Industry FE No No No No No No
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A2: Robustness check: Controlling for exposure to the Fama-French
factors
This table shows results of OLS regressions of individual stock returns in three time periods
(indicated in the column headers), on firm-level variable of interest (China exposure, foreign
revenues, leverage, and cash holdings). The dependent variables are cumulative (raw) returns
in panel A, including the firm loadings on market, size, and value factors as additional controls,
and cumulative Fama-French-adjusted returns in panel B. All models control for GICS
industry group fixed effect indicators and standard firm characteristics (size, profitability,
and book-to-market). The sample consists of nonfinancial Russell 3000 constituents. t-
statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01.
Incubation Outbreak Fever
Jan02-Jan17 Jan20-Feb21 Feb24-Mar20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dependent variable: Cumulative returns
China (#) -0.009 -0.069*** 0.048
(-0.61) (-2.69) (1.45)
Foreign revenues 0.004 -0.004 -0.036** -0.055*** -0.012 -0.000
(0.32) (-0.34) (-2.37) (-4.08) (-0.67) (-0.01)
Leverage 0.020 0.013 -0.137***
(1.27) (0.57) (-6.42)
Cash/assets 0.018 0.055** 0.097***
(1.00) (2.00) (3.49)
FF market beta 0.804 0.059 -2.632** -3.199*** -4.856*** -4.220***
(0.83) (0.07) (-2.23) (-2.79) (-3.47) (-3.24)
FF size beta -0.385 -0.180 0.649 0.887 -2.531** -2.620***
(-0.29) (-0.15) (0.59) (0.88) (-2.40) (-2.66)
FF value beta -2.973*** -2.630*** -3.647*** -3.024*** -1.870** -0.437
(-4.86) (-4.31) (-4.10) (-3.40) (-2.06) (-0.48)
Observations 1,701 1,829 1,698 1,826 1,699 1,827
R-squared .193 .195 .158 .162 .251 .285
Panel B: Dependent variable: Fama-French-adjusted cumulative returns
China (#) -0.013 -0.077*** 0.159**
(-0.92) (-2.88) (2.48)
Foreign revenues 0.003 -0.006 -0.040** -0.061*** 0.045 0.089***
(0.28) (-0.58) (-2.55) (-4.35) (1.23) (2.70)
Leverage 0.017 0.015 -0.086**
(1.19) (0.66) (-2.05)
Cash/assets 0.002 0.045* 0.039
(0.12) (1.69) (0.71)
Observations 1,701 1,829 1,698 1,826 1,699 1,827
R-squared .072 .074 .071 .069 .216 .209
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A3: Call negativity and talking about COVID-19
This table shows, for all conference calls, OLS regression results of call negativity on firm
characteristics and their interactions with an indicator equal to one for coronavirus-covering
conference calls. Our definition of negativity follows that of Loughran and McDonald
(2011). All models control for GICS industry group fixed effect indicators and standard
firm characteristics (size, profitability, and book-to-market). The sample includes conference
calls of nonfinancial Russell 3000 constituents held between January 20 and March 20, 2020.
t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. *p <.1;
**p <.05; ***p <.01.
Incubation Outbreak Fever
Jan02-Jan17 Jan20-Feb21 Feb24-Mar20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: COVID-19 negativity
COVID-19 (0/1) 0.085** 0.095** -0.009 0.179*** 0.165*** 0.057
(2.51) (2.06) (-0.17) (2.73) (3.23) (0.79)
Foreign revenues × 0.002* 0.004*** 0.001
COVID-19 (0/1) (1.75) (2.86) (0.60)
Leverage × 0.001 -0.002 0.003**
COVID-19 (0/1) (0.85) (-1.20) (2.27)
Foreign revenues 0.001 0.002*** 0.000 0.002** 0.000 0.001
(0.74) (2.71) (0.26) (2.51) (0.19) (1.38)
Leverage 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001
(1.29) (0.43) (0.65) (1.40) (1.36) (-0.83)
Cash/assets -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.48) (-0.50) (-0.35) (-0.16) (-0.22) (-0.15)
Observations 2,242 2,242 1,176 1,176 1,066 1,066
R-squared .120 .119 .145 .139 .137 .141
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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